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Economists discuss multi-level governance in terms of fiscal federalism, namely as a 
problem of assigning fiscal functions optimally to different tiers of government. This 
literature assumes that the jurisdiction of the monetary authority coincides with that of 
the central fiscal authority. However, EMU implied for each member state that national 
fiscal policy became devolved relative to supranational monetary policy. In several 
member states, this ‘upward’ devolution of stabilisation came on top of fiscal 
decentralisation in the conventional sense. In the run-up to EMU, and even earlier, 
governments tended to decentralise public finances. The question this paper asks is how 
this dual trend of devolution relates to the goals of the EMU fiscal framework and its 
operation in practice. In this paper, we argue that laboratory fiscal federalism is a more 
appropriate framework than functional public finance or constitutional public choice for 
understanding fiscal devolution in EMU. We explore to what extent national 
governments have used innovations in upward and downward devolution to get better 
control over their budgets, using EMU as a lever. We also ask what this potential gain in 
budgetary control and consolidation has meant for national stabilisation in EMU.  
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 A. Introduction: The puzzles of devolved fiscal governance in EMU 
Economists discuss multi-level governance in terms of fiscal federalism, namely as a 
problem of assigning the fiscal functions of stabilisation, redistribution and Pareto-
superior allocation optimally to different tiers of government (Oates 1999). This approach 
treats fiscal decentralization as a matter of economic constitution or governance and not 
merely as a matter of financial contracting.
1 Assuming that the jurisdiction of the 
monetary authority coincides with that of the central fiscal authority, the stabilisation 
function is assigned to the centre. However, the European monetary union implied for 
each member state that national fiscal policy became devolved relative to supranational 
monetary policy, raising the question of how stabilisation should be assigned. A potential 
problem of economic governance in EMU is that there is no mechanism for determining 
the aggregate fiscal stance and no way of coordinating this fiscal stance with monetary 
policy. This has been noted by macroeconomists for a long time; and is typically 
diagnosed as a symptom of the deficiencies in political integration (e.g. De Grauwe 
2006).  
 
Furthermore, in several member states, this ‘upward’ devolution of stabilisation relative 
to monetary policy came on top of fiscal devolution in the conventional, downward 
sense.
2 Ever since the 1980s, governments have tended to decentralise public finances, ie 
devolve tax or spending powers to sub-national governments (Darby et al 2003; 
Bordignon 2006: 128-130; Keating 2007: 18). It is difficult to maintain that this problem 
arises because of a lack of political integration although it equally raises the problem of 
how stabilisation function should be assigned
3. The trend towards downward devolution 
has attracted the interest of scholars in fiscal federalism who have examined the 
incentives that politically driven assignments give to the various tiers of government to 
fulfil the three fiscal functions. Of particular interest in this context is the interaction 
between fiscal decentralisation and the maintenance of fiscal sustainability (Joumard and 
Kongsrud 2003, Darby et al 2004). This line of research has found that devolution has a 
rather ambiguous and often detrimental effect on budgetary consolidation.  
 
The overall question this paper tries to answer then is how this dual trend of devolution, 
downwards and upwards (Bordignon 2006: 110), relates to the goals of the EMU fiscal 
framework and its operation in practice; a framework that tries to tie governments’ hands 
with respect to discretionary stabilisation and to steer their hands with respect to national 
budgetary consolidation. In order to answer this question, we argue that laboratory fiscal 
                                                 
1 This alternative of treating fiscal relationships among government levels as analogous to contracts in the 
finance literature is arguably more ‘modern’ because it uses the microeconomic machinery of principal-
agent models. Wildasin (1997, 2004) is a pioneer of this approach. Bordignon (2006: 118-121) links the 
two literatures, stressing the relevance of the fiscal federalism framework. 
2. This impact on devolution is specific to the stabilisation function, in political terms European integration 
induces recentralisation at the national level as Keating (2007: 15) points out: “The first [effect] was a 
recentralisation as matters of regional competence were transferred to Europe. Since states tended to view 
European policy as a matter of foreign affairs, these competences were brought into the reserved domain of 
the centre.” 
3 See Wibbels and Rodden (2006), we discuss their findings below. 
  2federalism can help us to understand the pattern of fiscal devolution in EMU. Laboratory 
federalism is the time-honoured idea that “a federal system may offer some real 
opportunities for encouraging […] experimentation and thereby promoting ‘technical 
progress’ in public policy” when a pressing social problem needs novel solutions (Oates 
1999: 1132). We have added ‘fiscal’ to Oates’ (1999) expression ‘laboratory federalism’ 
because we explore to what extent national governments have used innovations in 
upward and downward devolution to get better control over their budgets, using EMU as 
a lever, not to what extent they have used it for policy experiments in general. Finally, we 
ask what the potential gain in budgetary control and consolidation in EMU means for 
national stabilisation. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section summarizes the evidence on fiscal 
decentralisation in consolidation and stabilisation that has attracted the interest of 
economists in recent years. The following third section uses the conceptual framework of 
fiscal federalism, as outlined in the MacDougall report (CEC 1977), to highlight why the 
dual devolution of public finances in EMU begs an explanation, in particular for the 
stabilising function; we outline a tentative answer in terms of laboratory fiscal federalism 
which builds on Oates (1999) and is contrasted with constitutional public choice 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1980). In the fourth section, we provide evidence for the effects 
of the ‘passive’ or upward devolution of stabilisation, asking how much need for 
differential fiscal policy there is in EMU and how adequate fiscal policies of member 
states have been in this regard. We argue that there is some evidence that consolidation 
has been pursued to the detriment of stabilisation, and, furthermore, that central 
governments have endeavoured to transmit these consolidation pressures downwards 
through mechanisms of fiscal control that emulate the arrangements in EMU. We 
conclude by reflecting on the implications of this ‘isomorphism’ in fiscal surveillance. 
B. The pattern of fiscal decentralisation in EU member states 
There are many reasons why countries have devolved fiscal responsibilities ever since the 
1980s (Darby et al 2003, Keating 2007) which have to do with democratisation, pressures 
for more regional self-determination, and, sometimes, an ideological emphasis on 
efficiency and choice rather than equality and universalism. While consolidation was not 
the only and often not even the predominant motivation for decentralising fiscal 
relationships, we can look at how devolutions have impacted on, and were sometimes 
directly related to
4, the efforts at reducing deficits and public debt that the Maastricht 
process called for.  
 
Fiscal devolution in the EU-14 member states does not show much change between 1985 
and 2001 if we measure it as a rising share of sub-national governments in revenue or 
spending of general government (graph 1). However, this measure is beset with all kinds 
of difficulties because it does not reveal how much autonomy sub-national governments 
actually have in revenue raising or spending decisions (Darby et al 2004: 5; Fiva 2006: 
251-252). Typically, autonomy comes with all kinds of strings attached on the spending 
                                                 
4 Von Hagen et al (2001) explicitly analyse the attempts at consolidation in Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Spain that try to get fiscal relations under control. However, the period covered is pre-EMU. 
  3side and often not with autonomy over both the tax rate and the tax base.  To that extent  
the measure of shares tends to overstate the degree of devolution, an issue to which we 
come back below. Yet, what this measure does show is that the spending side is typically 
more devolved than the revenue side, Ireland being the notable exception among the EU-
14 countries. There is also considerable more variation between member states on the 
spending side than on the revenue side. But this variation itself does not change much 
between 1985 and 2001, there is no convergence towards an EU average. A slight 
divergence on the spending side is due solely to the outliers: Denmark, which is not a 
member of the Eurozone and interestingly enough the most devolved country in the 
sample although it is a unitary state, became even more decentralised between 1985 and 
2001. Greece, having the most centralised fiscal constitution among the EU-14, 
centralised its fiscal relations even more although the change is slight.  
 
Graph 1: Changes in fiscal decentralisation relative to EU-14 average (1985-2001) 
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Source: own calculations based on Joumard and Kongsrud (2003: Table 1) 
 
It is noticeable that, while eleven out of the fourteen ‘old’ EU members decentralised 
spending (only Germany centralised to some extent after unification), only five 
governments decentralised revenues. Three centralised with almost half of the EU-14 not 
changing. The result was that the EU-14 average shows a rising share of sub-national 
governments on the spending side but virtually no change on the revenue side. Graph 2 
shows the result, a rising ‘fiscal gap’ (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003: 13-14) or increasing 
‘vertical imbalance’ between own revenues and spending at the sub-central level, the 
difference being made up by grants or debt (Darby et al 2004: 14). Germany and Italy are 
  4the only exceptions from this pattern of devolution. The widening fiscal gap reflects a 
general trend among OECD countries. 
 
Chart 2: Fiscal gap between devolution in revenue and spending, 1985 compared to 2001 
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The signs of isomorphism in fiscal surveillance are of particular interest to us in studying 
fiscal relations within states in the context of EMU. What we mean by that is that the 
adoption of a Pact and fiscal rules at the supranational level finds counterparts in 
mechanisms that serve the enforcement of fiscal discipline at the sub-national level 
(Joumard and Kongsrud 2003: Annex; see also Bordignon 2006: 125-134). We list only 
those innovations that can be clearly related to EMU because of their timing:
5  
•  Domestic Stability Pacts have been introduced in Austria and in Italy since 1999; 
while the Pact seems to work reasonably well in Austria it plays a weak if not 
completely irrelevant role in Italy. A National Stability Pact has also been introduced 
in Germany since 2003 which was directly triggered by the country’s violation of the 
SGP; its existence did not much to prevent Germany’s excessive deficits in 
subsequent years, however. 
•  Balanced Budget rules, already in place in several OECD countries, most notably the 
US, have been introduced for municipalities in Finland since 2001, and for regional 
government in Spain since 2001. 
                                                 
5 This is likely to be an underestimation of the role of EMU because countries may have changed their 
fiscal relations in anticipation of EMU; Italy which has undergone the most radical devolution process in 
the 1990s seems to be such a case (Bordignon 2006: 128). 
  5•  Debt limits have been enshrined in the constitution of Poland which was clearly 
drawn up with a view to accession; non-constitutional debt limits on sub-national 
authorities have been introduced in Portugal since 2002 and in the Slovak Republic 
since 2005. 
 
The following graph 3, directly out of DG Ecfin’s annual publication on ‘Public Finances 
in EMU’, illustrates as well that the use of fiscal rules to rein in different tiers of fiscal 
systems, has considerably increased in recent years. It has to be kept in mind, however, 
that the rise between 2000 and 2005 is largely due to the enlargement of the union. 
 
Graph 3: Number of numerical fiscal rules in place in EU member states 
 
Source: Public Finances in EMU (2006: 136) 
 
The graph shows that rules for local governments have been in place throughout the 
period, while rule-based surveillance of regional government, social security and central 
government has intensified considerably. There are qualitative differences between the 
rules: rules on local and regional governments tend to be legal or even constitutional, and 
enforcement mechanisms tend to be stronger in terms of sanctions and periodicity 
(generally they are specified annually). General and central government rules are often 
based on political agreements between ruling parties and apply multi-annually (DG Ecfin 
2006: 137-138).  
 
We now turn to the question of how to make sense of this pattern of devolution, in 
particular the ‘federal politics of fiscal gaps’. Increasing vertical imbalances between 
devolution in spending and revenue are not confined to EU countries, but they raise more 
questions in EMU as indicated in the introduction. 
  6C. Using fiscal federalism theory to explain dual devolution   
The fiscal framework of EMU looks rather dysfunctional from the perspective of 
functional fiscal federalism. This is well-known by now and will be summarized with a 
focus on stabilisation below.
6 In this section we consider two alternative explanations of 
the framework: one based on public choice theory that sees monetary union as reining in 
expansionary and profligate national governments, and an account based on laboratory 
fiscal federalism. 
 
The textbook theory of fiscal federalism was outlined in the MacDougall report, a study 
for the European Commission on the assignment and integration of public finance 
functions that would prepare the European Communities for monetary integration (CEC 
1977). The public finance theory of fiscal federalism (Musgrave 1959, Oates 1972) tells 
us how the policy functions of stabilisation, redistribution and Pareto-superior allocation 
should be assigned optimally in a decentralised government setting. The most relevant 
message of this literature is in the present context that stabilisation, by way of a counter-
cyclical variation of the overall government balances, should be decided and 
implemented at the most central level (Oates 1977: 282-287). This centralisation message 
is so clear that Keating (2007: 11) does not even consider stabilisation as being one of the 
powers to devolve. The close linkages between regional economies of a federation imply 
that there are significant spillovers between regional business cycles because of the 
fluctuations they create in interregional trade. For the same reason, openness to each 
other, the capacity for stabilisation at the regional level is weak since the fiscal effect, 
intended to stimulate or restrict regional demand, tends to ‘leak’ via the trade balance. 
Thus, only if the risks of volatility can be pooled at the central level will the constituent 
regions of a fiscal federation get some insurance against regional fluctuations of income 
and employment. Fulfilling this insurance function by the central budget requires the 
government to get the policy mix with monetary policy right, implying that the monetary 
and fiscal authorities coordinate their actions (Oates 1977: 285; 293-294). In general, the 
theory has assumed that a fiscal federation is a single-currency area.
7  
 
The MacDougall report explored how much integration of public finances is required in 
order to get the necessary degree of real convergence that a single currency presupposes 
(CEC1977: 11). Stabilisation policy at the Community level was then seen as constrained 
by the lack of monetary integration – ie the authors had little doubts that once 
governments gave up their ‘jealously guarded’ monetary sovereignty, a proper 
assignment of the stabilisation function would follow.
8 Thus, multi-level fiscal 
                                                 
6 See the introduction to Baimbridge and Whyman (2004) or most recently Collignon (2007). 
7 One could argue even more forcefully that one monetary policy has a differential impact on the 
economies of the union’s members, adding a new risk to their stability; therefore fiscal stabilisation should 
be exercised where this particular risk originates, ie at the supranational level of monetary policy 
8 “It is hard to envisage the adequate debt financing power and mechanisms which a Community anti-
cyclical budgetary policy would require, in a framework where control of monetary policy and access to the 
member states’ capital markets are jealously guarded national prerogatives.’ (CEC 1977: 57) What this also 
implies – and becomes explicit in some parts of the report (eg CEC 1977: 67) – is that the authors assumed 
  7governance in the EU violates basic analytic assumptions of the theory of fiscal 
federalism. And quite pragmatically, it has led to the opposite of what the MacDougall 
report envisioned, which was a degree of budgetary centralisation to prepare for 
monetary unification. The Maastricht Treaty led to devolution upward (decentralisation 
by creating a supranational tier for monetary policy and fiscal surveillance) and the 
regulatory fiscal policy of the supranational level now urges national stabilisation to serve 
above all the provision of the public good ‘sound money, sound finance’ for the monetary 
union as a whole. One obvious explanation for this ‘perverse’ architecture is that these 
distortions are created by an incomplete political union and the lack of a fiscal 
constitution that goes with it (eg Collignon 2007).  However, this is hardly an explanation 
but a way of highlighting the puzzle: how could the proponents of EMU claim that the 
monetary union will lead to improved stabilisation and more stability if this union defies 
standard economic principles? 
 
One way of making sense of the fact that European integration seems to contradict fiscal-
federal principles is normative or ‘constitutional’ public choice theory (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980: ch.9). Here federalism is analysed as a constitutional way of preventing 
a monolithic government that exploits its citizens, by creating competition between 
jurisdictions, mainly through trade and unrestricted migration. What fiscal federalism 
perceives as a problem, regulatory and fiscal competition, is seen as a solution in public 
choice, once the ‘benevolent despotism’ view of government of welfare economics is 
replaced by the Leviathan view of government. Applying this view to EMU, we can see 
that the devolution which monetary integration has inevitably meant for macroeconomic 
stabilisation in member states is normatively desirable: it holds interventionism and fiscal 
activism in check since more of it would benefit neighbours rather than domestic 
constituencies. Similarly, more price and wage transparency and the increased mobility 
of capital create more competition and thus discipline high tax countries.  
 
To explain why Leviathan, being what it is, would thus constrain itself, the normative or 
‘constitutional’ branch of public choice theory must explain the entry into EMU by a 
combination of the Olsonian logic of collective action and Putnam’s two level-game 
(Rotte 2004: 51-53; cf Vaubel 1994): Governments entered an international commitment 
to rein in unsustainable fiscal profligacy at home. Either there was a successful revolt of 
the median voter against ongoing fiscal profligacy driven by special interests or 
Leviathan realised that fiscal exploitation is punished by way of a dwindling tax basis and 
high interest rates on public debt.  
 
If this public choice interpretation of devolution in EMU is correct, we should see two 
things. At the national level, we should see less activist fiscal policy, and at the 
subnational level we should see a shift towards ‘competitive federalism’ (Keating 2007: 
18), which, by creating tax competition, would force lower tiers of government to reduce 
                                                                                                                                                 
that monetary integration would follow closer political and real integration, not serve as a vehicle to 
achieve the latter.  
  8spending and taxation.
9 We present some evidence of activism on stabilisation in the next 
section. For now we can note that the pattern of devolution to subnational governments is 
not consistent with a competitive federalist interpretation. On the contrary, expenditure 
has been devolved more than revenue. This uneven devolution reduces rather than 
intensifies tax competition, while on the expenditure side, local interests may get even 
more reason to lobby sub-national authorities for spending programmes that benefit them. 
This is the main reason why vertical imbalance may lead to soft budget constraints: if 
sub-national governments get spending powers without the corresponding revenue raising 
powers, they tend to see budget constraints as a matter of negotiation, resulting in 
excessive transfers, or of co-insurance that they can manipulate by provoking a bail-out 
ex post (Bordignon 2006: 121; 124-125). This seems to have been the case in Germany 
and Italy but not in Sweden. A countervailing force to the incentives for overspending is 
that the central government may reveal it as such, for instance by benchmarking regional 
expenditure on local services (e.g. standard spending assessments in the UK), so that 
regional and local authorities get the political blame for mismanagement.  But this seems 
not always to work: In his econometric study of 18 OECD countries that takes account of 
information on the statutory constraints on local autonomy, Fiva (2006) finds that 
devolution on the spending side decreases the size of the budget, in line with the tax 
competition framework backing the Leviathan hypothesis, while devolution on the 
spending side increases the size of budgets. Vertical imbalance should then favour an 
asymmetric expansion of spending, with knock-on effects on local indebtedness or inter-
governmental transfers.
10  
 
Furthermore, the extension of fiscal control by central government and innovations in 
national pacts, debt limits and balanced budget rules constraining subnational 
governments, are also not favourable to the constitutional public choice explanation. If 
anything, Leviathan in the disguise of central government has become more pivotal in the 
entire fiscal architecture. Central government has all the responsibility for compliance 
with EMU and consequently attempts to exercise this responsibility vis-à-vis lower tiers 
of government.  The normative branch of public choice would rather call for 
responsibility to be devolved, and only serves to highlight the puzzle: why was there this 
trend towards rising vertical imbalance if that creates problems for consolidation and puts 
more pressures on central governments which are struggling to come to terms with the 
constraints imposed by EMU? 
 
Thus we turn to an interpretation that is broadly compatible with a functionalist 
federalism view in a situation where a particular set-up is out of institutional equilibrium: 
this amounts to looking at federalism from the perspective of the political economy of 
                                                 
9 Note that the principal-agent theory or financial contracting approach to fiscal federalism would lead to 
the exactly opposite prediction: here, devolution is seen as raising a number of incentive problems that may 
lead to soft budget constraints for sub-national governments (see Bordignon 2006 for a careful discussion). 
10 It is difficult to establish that this is because of a moral hazard problem created by rising fiscal gaps, for 
one because its manifestations can be completely different (too little or too much sub-national debt, 
depending on whether excessive transfers ex ante or an unwarranted bail-out materialised) and because 
sub-national debt may have occurred because central funding was inadequate, not because the sub-national 
government engaged in free-riding and changed its spending behaviour. 
  9reform. Laboratory federalism turns basic tenets of functional public finance on its head 
by explaining that devolution provides opportunities for learning in a situation of 
imperfect information (Oates 1999: 1131-1134). The information problem that monetary 
union has created is how governments can fulfil their basic functions in a framework of 
fiscal surveillance that prioritizes fiscal consolidation.  Devolution provides the space for 
finding novel solutions by decentralising the responsibility for budgetary policy, thus 
containing the risk to the rest of the polity in case an experiment fails. It is the role of the 
central level to provide the public good of lesson drawing in sufficient quantity.  The 
approach retains a functionalist, problem-solving underpinning characteristic of the 
mainstream of fiscal federalism, while the specification of the setting – imperfect 
information with learning externalities – allows it to explain more decentralisation than is 
warranted by the standard theory.  
 
Leading examples of laboratory federalism include reforms to social assistance and 
employment programmes that aim to increase the flexibility of local and regional 
governments in adapting programmes to local conditions and addressing local problems. 
A feature of these examples is that the fiscal function of redistribution, which is usually 
assigned to the national level, is devolved. Fiscal competition is, however, avoided by the 
maintenance of national legal frameworks for provision and by shared financing 
arrangements between central and subnational levels (Mabbett and Bolderson 1998). 
These examples reveal an important problem with the standard fiscal federalist model 
which, interestingly, was commented on by Oates (1977) in his contribution to the 
MacDougall report. The functionalist theory of fiscal federalism assumes that the 
government powers of stabilisation, redistribution and allocation (public goods provision) 
can be clearly differentiated (Oates 1977: 301). An analytical way of separating them is: 
stabilisation tries to dampen the volatility around the trend growth of income; 
redistribution tries to make the trend income (of different regions or individuals) 
converge; allocation tries to make this trend to converge upwards by realizing Pareto 
gains, turning the distributive zero-sum game into a positive-sum game. In practice, 
however, welfare state reform programmes frequently bring together redistributive and 
allocative functions, for example in trying to improve the functioning of the labour 
market or in other ways enhance the operation of ‘social policy as a productive factor’. 
Furthermore, redistributive social programmes provide an automatic mechanism of 
countercyclical expenditure adjustment, so they overlap with the stabilisation function as 
well (Mabbett and Schelkle 2007). This creates the danger, much commented on in the 
context of US welfare reform, that if governments devolve spending which is 
predominantly on social services without paying attention to countercyclical financing,
11 
they may force subnational governments to engage in pro-cyclical expenditure that 
affects the stabilising capacity of the tax-transfer system as a whole (Wibbels and Rodden 
2006). 
 
The implication of this is that a fiscal federalist assignment of policy functions could not 
be preserved in a world of social policy experiments which blur the distinctions between 
                                                 
11 For example, if they underfund the mandate to provide services, in an effort to enforce cutbacks in 
provision (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003: 22-23). 
  10functions and aim to find policies which fulfill multiple functions in complementary 
ways. Furthermore, if we look at the way that fiscal surveillance has evolved in EMU, we 
find the same blurring in the course of identifying priorities for fiscal consolidation. In 
EMU, the overarching norm of fiscal sustainability imposes a criterion of intertemporal 
efficiency, ie allocation, on the stabilisation function and, in the revised Pact
12 on 
redistribution. Measures promoted under consolidation pressures such as the closing 
down of early retirement schemes and the promotion of tax credits for working parents in 
place of unemployment benefits or social assistance, turn redistributive policies into 
allocative ones.
13
 
Along with this mixing of policy areas and functions, we also find that the assignment of 
executive competences is not clearly defined as it should be in a fiscal federalist 
framework. In EMU, this is true both of supranational-national and of national-
subnational relationships. The governance levels of fiscal stabilisation are intertwined: 
we have the EU, in the disguise of DG Ecfin and the Ecofin Council of Ministers, 
exercising fiscal surveillance at the supranational level but not providing any fiscal means 
for achieving compliance. The responsibility for complying with the fiscal rules in 
E(M)U lies solely with national authorities who in turn depend on the cooperation by 
sub-national fiscal authorities and, in some member states, by the semi-autonomous 
public agencies (parafisci) providing social security.
14  
 
This intertwining is a problem for laboratory federalism in that it looks more like a way 
of sharing the risk of political blame than a way of containing risks from an experiment 
for the rest of the federation (Oates 1999: 1131). But it can be reconciled with laboratory 
reform politics in that the intertwining of government levels is a way of enforcing the 
‘revolution from above’, ie national governments wanting to make sub-national 
governments change their ways, with the stipulations of the Pact and the BEPG as a 
pretext for changes. This alternative would suggest that we should see changes that 
actually give sub-national governments some leeway for experimentation while the 
central government level tries to keep control, say through regulatory oversight such as 
standard-setting, that reins in the incentives for sub-national overspending.  
 
                                                 
12 Governments must now include long-term projections of their public finances in their stability and 
convergence programmes to get a grip on the liabilities of old-age security; the on-set of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure can now also be stopped for up to five years if governments can demonstrate that a 
deficit above (but close to) 3% of GDP is due to the introduction of a mandatory, fully funded pension 
pillar which promises fiscal savings in the long run. 
13 In another paper, we analyse how the EU reconstructs distributive policies as allocative policies (Mabbett 
and Schelkle 2006). 
14 In some member states, these parafisci or semi-autonomous public agencies that administer pensions, 
health care and unemployment insurance, control a higher share of the general government’s fiscal 
resources than the central government. In Germany, for instance, their share in general government 
spending amounts to more than 40% while that of the sub-national governments (Bundesländer) is a bit less 
than 40% and the central government (Bund) the remaining 20% (all figures for 2005, see presentation of 
Snelting and Brunton at the LSE workshop, available on the Newgov website). 
  11A further implication of the idea of laboratory fiscal federalism is that it does not describe 
equilibrium or stability in functions and assignments, given that its purpose is to promote 
innovation and reform. The political economy of reform (Rodrik 1996) and experiences 
with policy learning and transfer (James and Lodge 2003) suggest that learning and 
subsequent reforms are not straightforward processes. On the contrary, both literatures 
provide plenty of reasons why we should expect an inherent preference for business as 
usual, a status quo bias, making any intended change the exception that proves the rule. 
To overcome the status quo bias, governments must break the routines and rules that 
favour existing interests, which typically means to change procedures, ways of doing 
things rather than directly the things to do, ie the policies themselves. Laboratory fiscal 
federalism, devolution or reassignment of fiscal responsibilities to allow for innovation, 
is such a reform strategy.  
 
How would this political economy approach to laboratory federalism explain the case of 
macroeconomic stabilisation in EMU? It has been amply documented, most notably by 
McNamara (1998) and Dyson and Featherstone (1999), that the ‘road to Maastricht’ 
meant a break with a particular understanding of Keynesianism which had neglected the 
inflationary consequences of fiscal activism. Reining in ever higher fiscal deficits became 
a priority, when counter-cyclical stabilisation seemed to work only too well, namely 
driving budget deficits in a protracted phase of stagflation. The entry criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty as well the ensuing institutions to supervise the adjustment process, 
such as the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), can be seen as manifestations of 
laboratory federalism, asking all pupils in class to report progress on agreed indicators 
which is then benchmarked and peer reviewed.
15 The fact that even countries that are not 
members of the monetary union have subjected themselves to the BEPG process can be 
interpreted, optimistically, as seizing the opportunity for learning. Moreover, it can be 
seen as evidence of lesson drawing that the Austrian, Italian and the German government 
have introduced SGP-type control mechanisms and other member states have 
implemented numerical fiscal rules, often focusing on deficit and debt limits analogous to 
the SGP. 
 
This interpretation may also make us understand why the original Pact could not be 
upheld: its intended quasi-automatism and hard sanctions under the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure did not acknowledge imperfect information or the uncertainty there is 
(Schelkle 2005). National budgetary processes are still adjusting to the emphasis on 
consolidation and long-term sustainability while counter-cyclical stabilisation has been 
constrained to an unknown degree. Political institutions in member states have not 
necessarily found their role yet, especially in relation to detailed fiscal surveillance 
exercised by the Commission and Eurostat, which may raise problematic issues for the 
scrutiny by national parliaments and for the division of responsibilities between levels of 
government. Under these circumstances, the attempt to enforce strict common rules may 
militate against learning and favour a return to the bad old ways. The revision of the Pact 
                                                 
15 This makes EMU even a more pertinent example for laboratory federalism than the US welfare reform 
that Oates (1999) had in mind, which has no forum for the exchange of lessons or an agreed system of 
indicators to measure success in different states (Walker and Wiseman 2006). 
  12has arguably taken this into account and is more conducive to laboratory fiscal federalism 
(cf Schelkle 2007). 
 
Laboratory federalism can make broad sense of the politics of vertical imbalance 
although we do not claim this to be the only possible explanation. In the EMU context, 
this recasting of fiscal responsibilities between national and sub-national governments is 
in line with the requirement of keeping overall control of the budget without losing sight 
of the fact that even in times of ‘permanent fiscal austerity’ (Pierson), crucial government 
functions must be fulfilled.  Greater leeway or autonomy on the spending side could be 
rationalised as providing the means for experimentation with spending programmes by 
lower tiers of government, in line with considerations for greater efficiency and 
accountability. However, this gain in room for learning and experimentation would 
undermine the goal of consolidation if soft budget constraints become more of a problem. 
Thus the implementation of additional control mechanisms that reduce the degree of 
effective devolution; it is noticeable that the strings attached on sub-national authorities 
resemble the constraints that have been imposed on national governments by the EU 
level. This can be seen as lesson drawing of sorts.   
D. Stabilisation in laboratory fiscal federalism 
In this section, we examine the issues that laboratory fiscal federalism raises for 
stabilisation, both for EMU as a whole and for the sub-national level of particular 
member states. We argued that upward and downward devolution can be seen as an 
isomorphism in fiscal surveillance where the upper tier (the EU or national government) 
exercises SGP-type control with the aim of consolidation on the lower tier (national or 
sub-national authorities, respectively). In the case of upward devolution, this raises the 
problem of whether national governments are able to combine the stabilisation of the 
domestic economy with the need for stabilisation of EMU as a whole. In the case of 
downward devolution at least two questions arise, namely first how well the stabilisation 
of regions within the domestic economy fits into the EMU framework and second 
whether the isomorphic control mechanisms that have been introduced in the form of 
national stability pacts show some consideration of regional stabilisation; we can only 
report some evidence on the first part and have a closer look at the three national stability 
pacts with respect to the second.  
 
On the first issue of upward devolution, we try to assess how effective fiscal stabilisation 
in EMU has been, against the odds that there is no coordination of the aggregate fiscal 
stance complementary to monetary policy. Following and updating empirical work done 
by Gramlich and Wood (2000), we assess, first, how much need there is for a 
differentiated response to macroeconomic developments in EMU member states. Second, 
we ask how well member states’ fiscal systems did and do respond in terms of automatic 
and discretionary stabilisation but also consolidation, looking at actual and structural 
budget balances and how they correlate with their own output gaps. Third, we evaluate 
whether this differential response adds up in the aggregate to a fiscal stance that is 
consistent with the required policy mix.  
 
  13How different should macroeconomic stabilisation have been for EMU members? 
Following the methodology of Gramlich and Wood (2000), we assess this by calculating 
Taylor rules for different member states. A Taylor rule calculates the central bank interest 
rate that would have been in line with a country’s cyclical situation (output gap measured 
as actual minus trend GDP in percent of GDP at 1995 market prices) and inflationary 
pressures (price level increases above the central-bank’s target which we assume to be 
1.5%), assuming a stable ‘neutral’ or long run equilibrium interest rate and a certain 
weighting of the goal’s of employment and price stability in the central bank’s objective 
function. We assume a neutral interest rate of 2% which was the long-term real bond rate 
in 2004 when EMU as a whole had no output gap. We also assume as symmetric 
weighting of the two stability goals (weight of 0.5). Graph 4 shows the results of this 
stylised evaluation which is only meant to be indicative.
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Graph 4: The need for differential interest rates in EMU 
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In 1999-2000, the difference was 2.5-3% which converges to 1.5% in 2004 when the 
output gap for Euro area was close to 0. This suggests that even in real equilibrium for 
EMU as a whole, we need different fiscal responses. However, if we disregard Greece 
and later Netherlands, the range becomes fairly narrow, about 0.5%.   
 
How well did fiscal policy respond to the need for differential national responses? Again 
following and updating Gramlich and Wood (2000), we look at whether general budget 
balances have a counter-cyclical or a pro-cyclical stance which we measure by positive or 
                                                 
16 Thus, the formula for each country is: i* = r* + 0.5(output gap + excess inflation) where the the output 
gap and excess inflation is country-specific, r* is the neutral real interest rate. 
  14negative correlations between changes in budget deficits and changes in output gaps.
17 
The correlation with the actual balance is indicative of the operation of automatic 
stabilisers (e.g. income taxes or unemployment benefits that vary with the cycle, without 
government discretion) while the correlation with the structural or cyclically adjusted 
balance (excluding interest payments on public debt) indicates how actively the 
government may have pursued a counter- or pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
 
Graph 5: Counter- or pro-cyclical stance of actual balances  
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The majority of countries had a counter-cyclical stance in the actual balance, which 
suggests that their automatic stabilisers work well. But there are also a few pro-cyclical 
‘sinners’, among them Greece and Portugal, and surprisingly Austria which did not 
violate the Pact rules. Interestingly, other countries that are or were in breach of the Pact 
have improved their counter-cyclical stance in EMU  (France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands). 
 
                                                 
17 A positive correlation indicates a desirable counter-cyclical stance because the budget deficit goes up if 
the output gap, the shortfall of actual relative to trend output, goes up (both are negative figures but the 
correlation looks at them in absolute terms). 
  15Graph 6: Counter- or pro-cyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy 
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Among the delinquent countries, only Portugal can be accused of a pro-cyclical 
discretionary stance; Italy is neutral while all others try to exercise a counter-cyclical 
stance. While this cannot be more than indicative of what governments’ fiscal behaviour, 
it does suggests to us that breaking the stipulations of the original SGP is a genuine 
problem of fiscal control in a multi-level setting and member states have not done as 
badly in coping with it as the mainstream view has it. 
 
Finally on the issue raised by upward devolution, how effectively has national 
stabilisation contributed to stabilisation of EMU as a whole? We first look at the Taylor 
rule, calculated as before but for EMU-11 as a whole, compared to the actual ECB rate 
and then to what extent different budget deficit measures have corresponded to the 
monetary stance. 
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The stance of ECB monetary policy was continuously a bit more restrictive than a Taylor 
rule would have suggested but given our inevitably arbitrary assumptions about the 
weighting of ECB goals and the neutral interest rate we do not consider this to be a very 
significant result. What is significant is that the ECB interest rate did first move counter-
cyclically with a positive output gap, but then was slow to respond to worsening of the 
cyclical situation since 2001, although the move is not completely out of tune with the 
movement in the output gap. 
 
Graph 8: EMU fiscal stance (1999-2006 
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  17The indicators of the aggregate fiscal deficit show a lack of fiscal discipline or 
compliance depending on which measure we look at. When the output gap was positive, 
the Euro area overall above trend growth, the actual aggregate deficit was well within the 
3% criterion; if we look at the two cyclically-adjusted measures including interest rates it 
looks as if countries were collectively delinquent and stimulated pro-cyclically, in later 
years counter-cyclically. But if we exclude interest payments, the aggregate fiscal stance 
was remarkably tuned towards the EMU output gap situation and recently even 
supporting the ECB’s relatively restrictive monetary stance. This means that aggregate 
discretionary fiscal policy has become slightly pro-cyclical in recent years, thus 
sacrificing stabilisation to some extent to consolidation. In other words, the fiscal 
indicators suggests that it is history (stock of public debt) rather than present day 
delinquency that makes member states’ budgetary policies look as if they were overall 
non-compliant; and if governments try harder to comply, they easily risk making it more 
difficult for the EU area to get out of the current phase of stagnant growth.
18
 
Turning finally to the issues raised by laboratory fiscal federalism in downward 
devolution, we ask how well regional stabilisation fits into devolved national stabilisation 
outlined above and to what extent the national stability pacts show some consideration 
for the stabilisation of the sub-national economies thus controlled. For a preliminary 
answer on the first question, we can draw on Wibbels and Rodden (2006) who looked 
how well federations, all over the world and outside EMU, generate regional stability and 
stabilisation policies.
19 They first establish that own-sources of revenues of sub-central 
governments tend to be highly pro-cyclical, for instance sales taxes increase in booms 
and go down markedly in recessions. This would not be a problem or actually is as it 
should be for a counter-cyclical stance of devolved budgets as long as this does not force 
regional or local authorities into pro-cyclical variation of expenditure in order to keep a 
balanced budget. Thus, the next question they ask is whether regional authorities have 
access to borrowing so as to make up for the shortfall in revenue during recessions, or, if 
they are subject to a balanced budget rule, whether grants from the central level are 
counter-cyclical to make up for the shortfall. Wibbels and Rodden (2006) find that 
borrowing is a way of smoothing expenditure in Spain (and Australia) only while 
discretionary grants from central government has a pro-cyclical tendency, contrary to 
what they should from a functional point of view. Moreover, even in Spain (and 
Germany, the US and others) the pro-cyclicality of revenues does translate into pro-
cyclical expenditures (Wibbels and Rodden 2006: 174). This behaviour of expenditure is, 
as they note with respect to results by Hallerberg and Strauch for instance, in marked 
contrast to national expenditure which shows counter-cyclical and thus stabilising 
behaviour. 
 
The issue this raises for EMU is this. We have seen that devolution to subnational 
governments might be part of a consolidation strategy: one that endeavours to minimise 
                                                 
18 A noteworthy feature of all fiscal indicators in graph 8 is their inertia since 2001 even though the 
business cycle has moved quite a bit. 
19 For lack of detailed regional data, Wibbels and Rodden (2006) look at eight federations of which only 
two, Germany and Spain, are in the EU. 
  18the welfare costs of fiscal consolidation by promoting social policy experiments. 
However, subnational governments are weak stabilisers, so shifting the burden of 
compliance with consolidation could come at the cost of stabilisation. The innovations in 
federal fiscal surveillance, the national stability pacts, can give us some hints about the 
burden shifting or sharing, in particular whether they indicate any considerations for the 
need to control budgets but also maintain a capacity for stabilisation. A brief analysis of 
the three national stability pacts show some creativity in avoiding at least a worsening 
pro-cyclical stance of regional fiscal policies (Joumard and Kongsrud 2003: Annex; cf 
DG Ecfin 2006; Annex 1): 
•  The Austrian stability pact requires municipalities as a group to balance their budget 
over a multi-annual period while regions as a group have to produce annual surpluses 
of at least 0.75 percent of GDP. The pact provides the possibility to transfer deficits 
or surplus ratios to other regional governments. Thus, the group responsibility allows 
to pool and compensate risks at least within a group. The auction or transfer principle, 
analogous to the proposal of tradable permits of Casella (1999), allows response to 
region-specific shocks through horizontal redistribution, without offsetting the 
national level. The Pact establishes thus a division of responsibilities between tiers of 
government for both stabilisation and consolidation. 
•  The German pact imposes spending caps on the regional governments (‘Länder’) 
which allows them to respond to cyclical fluctuations with the variation of taxes or 
borrowing. Given that tax revenues are mostly shared, they are have access to 
borrowing which is constrained by Golden Rules that constrain borrowing to 
financing investment. These Golden Rules correspond to a Golden Rule at the 
national level. A cooperative committee has the oversight, which peer reviews 
performance and can make recommendations in the case of non-compliance. In other 
words, the Pact tries to extend the same obligations that the national government has 
under EMU and the German constitution on the sub-national levels.  
•  The Italian pact requires deficit reductions from regional governments relative to a 
no-policy-change baseline. It does so on a cash basis (which invites creative 
accounting, namely ordering services etc in the current fiscal period and defer 
payment to the next) and exempts some acyclical spending, such as on health care (so 
that a major item of discretionary spending is not affected by the obligation to 
consolidate which forces regional authorities to comply by cutting down on cyclical 
spending items). Thus, the national pact shifts the burden, its stipulations show little 
sensitivity for cyclical stabilisation needs of regions and thus achieves consolidation 
at the cost of stabilisation. 
 
Our interpretation of this qualitative piece of evidence, provided by laboratory fiscal 
federalism in EMU, is that most member state governments are actually aware of the 
inherent tension there is between consolidation and stabilisation. Devolution and sharing 
of the obligations under EMU makes these tensions even more precarious and there is 
still experimenting going on. 
 
  19E. Conclusion: Coping with imperfect information and institutional 
constraints 
In this paper, we explore what the dual process of fiscal devolution meant for the 
stabilising capacity of member states in EMU. The upward devolution, resulting from the 
decision of EMU architects not to create a central budget that corresponds to 
supranational monetary policy, prioritizes national fiscal consolidation over stabilisation 
of the union. This is seen by many as the price to be paid for a lack of political integration 
(De Grauwe 2006, Collignon 2007). There was also a process of downward devolution at 
the level of the politically integrated member states, not necessarily triggered by EMU, 
but starting in the 1980s when the good times of fiscal expansion had definitely come to 
an end and were replaced by the bleak vision of ‘permanent fiscal austerity’ (Pierson). 
We argued that the two most noticeable trends of this downward devolution were, first, 
an increasing fiscal gap between (less) decentralized revenue and (more) decentralized 
spending and, second, an emerging isomorphism between the regulation of national 
budgets by the EU and the regulation of sub-national budgets by national government, 
domestic stability pacts providing the clearest example of this isomorphism in multi-level 
fiscal surveillance.  
 
One way of making sense of dual devolution is constitutional public choice, since it turns 
the mainstream thoery of fiscal federalism on its head: fiscal competition is good because 
it keeps exploitation by Leviathan in check. Yet, both the rise in the fiscal gap and tighter 
regulation of sub-national budgets, e.g. by setting quality standards for local social 
services, mean that there is limited fiscal competition. Therefore, we took recourse to the 
notion of laboratory fiscal federalism. The first step in our argument is to note that EMU  
creates a rather difficult situation for national governments (cf Wibbels and Rodden 
2006: 161): first, they are responsible for compliance with the fiscal rules in EMU while 
they depend on lower tiers of government for achieving that, and second there is a tension 
with stabilisation even if they succeed in compliance.  
 
Upward devolution of the stabilisation function thus seems to have created a situation 
with which national governments must cope and one way of doing so is downward 
devolution. Laboratory fiscal federalism means exactly that central government creates 
the space and incentives for experimentation, here of how every tier can contribute to the 
fiscal consolidation effort without jeopardizing stabilisation. The evidence on aggregate 
fiscal stabilisation in EMU suggests that national governments have actually not done as 
badly as the demise of the original Pact suggests. Governments have tried to comply as 
far as their discretionary fiscal policy is concerned; trying harder, as in recent years could 
acutallly be (mildly) destabilising for EMU as a whole. National governments have also 
tried to devise fiscal rules, in particular domestic stability pacts, that indicate the effort to 
strike a balance between consolidation and stabilisation. Thus, we conclude that this 
challenge is built into the fiscal federal framework of EMU but experience so far suggests 
that national governments cope more constructively with it than they are usually given 
credit for. 
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